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In many ways, the emphasis on values, vis-à-vis interests, has been the dominant theme of international relations since the end of the Cold War. The decade of the 1990s was shaped by the experiences of intervention and non-intervention in relation to human rights abuses, closing with the Kosovo War in 1999, which Blair famously described in similar terms as a war fought 'not for territory but for values'. 8 It would seem that the Cold War world of realpolitik, in which interests of state security were considered primary, has been transformed into the post-Cold War world of valuebased policy-making in which security has been redefined in terms which see the security of regions of the world as interdependent, rather than conflictual, and the issues of concern extended away from external threats in the military sphere to internal questions of democracy, good governance and relief from poverty. individual has won and foreign policy is the continuation of domestic concerns beyond national boundaries and not vice versa. 10 Here, power is no longer projected as an act of interest-based hegemony but as an ethical or value-based act. This view of the disinterested projection of military and diplomatic power is reflected in the Barcelona Report, A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, commissioned by Solana, which argues that: 'A Human Security approach for the European Union means that it should contribute to the protection of every individual human being and not focus only on the Union's borders, as was the security approach of nation-states'. 11 Power has consistently been projected in terms of values, rather than interests, by the European Union and debate over Europe as a 'normative power' has been ongoing over the current decade.
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This paper seeks to elucidate briefly the impact of the shift from interests to values on theorising the international, highlighting the reaction against the interest-led methodological approach of Realism, and shift to approaches within the Constructivist framework. It suggests that, although providing a useful description and exploration of the new policy discourses, Constructivist approaches have been of limited use in explaining the reasons for this shift. This is because their 'antifoundational' approach has consciously avoided the need to ground the shift to values historically and materially. 13 In highlighting the one-sidedness of both the current Actors' interests and preferences are not given outside social interaction or deduced from structural constraints in the international or domestic environment.
Social constructivism does not take the interests of actors for granted, but problematizes and relates them to the identities of actors. We do not mean to ignore material conditions. Rather, the causal relationship between material and ideational factors is at stake. While materialist theories emphasize economic or military conditions or interests as determining the impact of ideas in international and domestic politics, social constructivists emphasize that ideas and communicative processes define in the first place which material factors are perceived as relevant and how they influence understandings of interests, preferences, and political decisions. Protect report, which suggests that rationalist approaches dissimulate international policy possibilities, whereas value-based understandings clarify them:
The notion of responsibility itself entails fundamental moral reasoning and challenges deterministic theories of human behaviour and international relations theory. The rejection of instrumentalist understandings of the international sphere, which necessarily follows from removing the ontological centrality of political interests, makes any deeper, contextual or structural explanation of current trends problematic.
Ideas and values necessarily become increasingly dealt with on their own terms and ascribed the agency which was previously associated with interest-bearing state actors. However, the shift from interests to values as the explanatory factor in international developments necessarily elides the concept of power, previously at the centre of Realist theorising. This paper suggests that for theorists of the international sphere to follow the ideas -the declarations of government spokesmen and policy think-tanks -rather than political interaction is problematic. This would be to renege on the task of critique: the attempt to explain and understand events, rather than just reflect the views of participants. In this regard, one of the most important issues in need of critical analysis would appear to be precisely that of the post-Cold War shift from interests to values.
Grounding Values
As Zaki Laïdi has pointed out, the Cold War era appeared to be one of a clear clash of interests, not because interests were self-obviously pre-given but because the through 'disciplinary neoliberalism', 42 and for neo-Foucauldians the ideological discourses of nationalism, 43 the freedom of the market, 44 or of 'participatory poverty reduction' 45 interpolate subjects willing to accept their own subjection. 46 However, these approaches remain, with the Constructivists, at the level of appearances. Despite the alleged instrumentalism of hidden 'interests', it is the ideas, the ideological appearances that do the work of enforcing the hegemony of power. While, for
Constructivists, the focus on values challenges hegemony, for Post-Realists value frameworks reinforce it. However, neither framework convincingly grounds the shift from interests to values.
An alternative way forward, suggested here, is to be found in the work of Karl Marx, not in his study of the struggle of collective class interests, to be found throughout his major works, or his work specifically on capitalist ideology and the alienation of labour, which is most fully articulated in the section on 'commodity fetishism' in Volume I of Das Kapital, but in his study of the disjuncture between interests and ideas, particularly with reference to Germany in the 1840s. This was a subject touched upon in much of his early work, for example, in the Deutsch-Französischer Jahrbücher of a collective future-orientated project except in an idealised form. As Marx stated in
1842:
We have to register a definite protest against this endless, nebulous and unclear ratiocination of those German liberals who think they honour liberty by relegating it to the starry heaven of imagination instead of basing it on the firm foundation of reality … [T]hese masters of imaginary ratiocination, … these masters of sentimental enthusiasm … are afraid lest their ideal be desecrated by its coming in touch with profane reality.
48
Here there was the language of liberalism, of democracy and freedom, but without the content of a forward-looking and economically and politically dynamic modernising political class. Rather than reflecting the confidence of a political elite determined to engage with and transform the world, the idealisation of liberal forms reflected the political incapacity of the German bourgeoisie, their inability to formulate a coherent political programme and their unwillingness to take the responsibility for moving beyond Germany's feudal and aristocratic past:
Kant, therefore, separated this theoretical expression from the interests which it expressed; he made the materially motivated determinations of the will of the French bourgeoisie into pure self-determinations of 'free will', of the will in and for itself, of the human will, and so converted it into purely ideological conceptual determinations and moral postulates. Hence the German petty bourgeoisie recoiled in horror from the practice of this energetic bourgeois liberalism as soon as this practice showed itself, both in the Reign of Terror and in shameless bourgeois profit-making.
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The German bourgeoisie took up the banner of liberal modernity solipsistically, in an idealised form, as they were unable to forge their own expressions of collective political purpose. In this respect, ideological forms which once expressed clear material interests were accepted 'merely as abstract ideas, principles valid in and for 48 Cited Similarly, Marx's understanding of German idealism offers an alternative to Constructivist approaches, which see ideas as driving reconceptions of interests rather than focusing on real lived social relations. The German bourgeoisie's idealism, their flight into abstract values was understood to be dislocated from their interests because of Marx's study of the specific material conditions prevailing in Germany. For Marx, the key to unlocking the idealist self-consciousness of the German bourgeoisie could not be found in the ideas themselves but only in the social context in which they were generated. In a direct critique of idealist approaches, and one which could be equally applied to approaches within the Constructivist framework today, Marx states:
In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive … in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life processes we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process … In the first method of approach the starting point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the second method, which conforms to real life; it is the real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness.
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Rather than study the ideological appearances -for example, the self-proclaimed rejections of narrowly conceived national interests and attention to global problems of humanity -to understand the change of interests of states or the transformation of the international system, Marx suggests studying the actors themselves. In the case of the German bourgeoisie, Marx concludes that it is their weakness and fragmentation, squeezed between the remnants of the ancien régime and the developing industrial proletariat, which explains their ideological flight into values. Rather than take on political responsibility for overthrowing the old order, the German bourgeoisie denied their specific interests and idealised progress in the otherworldly terms of abstract philosophy, recoiling from the consequences of their liberal aspirations in practice. 55 Marx, The German Ideology, 47.
Power and Interests Today
The malaise of the German political sphere in the first half of the nineteenth century was one which Marx, at the time, considered to be unique, noting that:
German history prides itself on having travelled a road which no other nation in the whole of history has ever travelled before, or ever will again. We have shared the restorations of modern nations without having shared their revolutions.
56
The German bourgeoisie was caught in an international context where events seemed to happen beyond their control, the centre of politics having shifted with the French
Revolution and English industrialisation. The bourgeoisie seemed powerless in the face of broader global forces and its inability to cohere society around a political programme domestically. In this context, its inability to formulate or pursue a political programme based on its own interests, or to project this in universal terms, was seen as an aberration by Marx and Engels, where there was a generalised crisis of political subjectivity. Neither the ancien régime, nor the bourgeoisie and the proletariat were strong enough politically to stamp their authority on society: 'all classes lack that breadth of spirit which identifies itself, if only for a moment, with the spirit of the people'. 57 In this political malaise no section of society was able to articulate an 'idea of the state' clearly: to generalise the interests of society in terms of the national interest.
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It is suggested here that Marx's acute analysis of the crisis of political subjectivity in relation to German idealism is of more than merely historical interest. In the very different context of today's post-political world, similar questions of the governing elite's capacity to cohere and project political authority are raised. The exercise of power increasingly appears to be vitiated by political incapacity, both domestically and internationally. Western elites seem to be increasingly isolated from their own societies and unable to develop or cohere forward-looking political programmes in the aftermath of the end of the ideological conflict of the Cold War. Rather than focus on the ethical rhetoric of world leaders, or the reflection of this idealism in many of the Normative and Constructivist commentaries in international relations, it is the real experiences of Western elites which give content to their idealist reflections. Rather than a Foucauldian, Realist or neo-Gramscian focus on the capacities of Western elites to further their interests under the banner of ethics, it seems that it is the incapacities of these elites that provide the specific content for twenty-first-century ethical or values-based agendas. This is captured well in the work of Alain Badiou, who argues:
Whether we think of it as the consensual representation of Evil or as concern for the other, ethics designates above all the incapacity, so typical of the contemporary world, to name and strive for a Good … [T]he 'concern for the other' signifies that it is not a matter -that it is never a matter -of prescribing hitherto unexplored possibilities for our situation, and ultimately for ourselves. The law (human rights, etc.) is always already there. This confusion is of great concern because it appears to give states authority to be free of political perspective … Thus our societies claim that the urgency of problems forbids them from reflecting on a project, while in fact it is their total absence of perspective that makes them slaves of emergencies. Today, Western political elites lack a strong political vision and therefore have a transformed perception of and relationship to political power. Governments and policy-makers are much more likely to experience their policy-making power as a 'risk' or a cause of potential embarrassment than as an opportunity. They often seek to reject, rather than welcome, the responsibilities of power. Rather than claiming the rights of power, many governments seem to be happier when they are disclaiming them, seeking to devolve policy-making responsibilities either to regional and local authorities or to higher bodies such as the European Union or international institutions. There is a crisis of political legitimacy at the level of the nation-state which is at the heart of the shift away from the projection of power in the framework of national interests. This is not so much because political elites have taken up new ideas, and thereby understand their interests as 'global concerns' rather than national ones, as much as the lack of an organising collective ideology. As Barry Buzan argues, the creation and projection of state interests is not possible without 'a distinctive idea of some sort which lies at the heart of the state's political identity'. 66 As Buzan suggests there is an intimate link between the domestic capacity of the political elite to generate and express a forward-looking project and the ability of a state to project its power in the international sphere, in terms of self-interest or national interest. It seems to be this lack of perceived legitimacy that drives government policy-making, rather the confidence of a popular mandate. 67 The desire to formulate policy without taking responsibility for the outcomes has engendered a shift of focus to the international sphere where the relationship between policy aims and results is a much more mediated one. However, the shift in focus to the international realm is a product of governmental weakness and disconnection from society, rather than a sign of having a clear sense of a collective or 'national' interest or purpose to project. 68 What is projected internationally is not a clear set of interests but a set of idealised aspirations. This makes both the formulation of policy and any strategic or long-term coherence problematic and results in both the development of policy and its implementation taking an irrational and ad hoc character. This is expressed in the contradictory process where political elites are keen to express the rhetoric of high moral responsibility in the international sphere but are reluctant to take responsibility for either policy-making or policy outcomes. This is reflected in four trends. There is space here to mention three of them only briefly in order to dwell slightly longer on the fourth. First there is the desire to act collectively, rather than unilaterally, to evade policy responsibility; this is seen most clearly in attempts to talk-up the importance of 'global' problems and pass organisational responsibility to the UN or other transnational actors. Secondly there is the tendency for government leaders, thinktanks and policy pundits to focus on problems beyond the capacity of the particular institution, government or agency; in this regard, rhetoric comes cheaply and blame can easily be passed to more powerful or resourceful actors, such as the US or the [W]ar is not waged necessarily to achieve predefined objectives, and it is in waging war that the motivation needed to continue it is found. In these cases -of collapse of a value/interest framework, leading increasingly to ad hoc, noninstrumentalist policy-making.
Conclusion
International policy-making in the post-Cold War era would therefore seem to be an idealised projection of the Western self, rather than the instrumental projection of strategic interests. Power is being projected internationally, but this is the production of 'hollow hegemony'. Western hegemony is increasingly a hollow one, lacking the content and purpose reflected in and reproduced through a cohering framework of values and interests. The implications of these idealised reflections of elite incapacity, at the root of moralised visions of the international sphere, cannot be captured unless a theoretical framework is developed which goes beyond the value-based discourses of policy actors, grounding an understanding in the materiality of the real lived experiences of policy elites. What this reveals is that, counter-intuitively perhaps, international politics is becoming less 'global' and, in fact, more inward-looking and solipsistic. 71 The retreat to ethical or value-based forms of legitimising policy is a reflection of the rejection of long-term strategic policy-making and the desire to disavow political responsibility when interventions are made. 72 The shift from interests to values reflects governing elites' highly limited perception of their capacity to engage instrumentally in the outside world. It is this lack of capacity which explains why Western elites seem to be more interested in policy declarations of intent than practical outcomes. This is borne out in the rejection of traditional instrumental forms of policy-making and policy judgements, with the act itself being judged on the basis of 'good intentions' rather than results. 73 This is clearly reflected in the 'war on terror', where despite the Manichean language of good and evil and the call for international collaboration, there seems to be no framework which can give policy-making a structure and purpose beyond declaratory statements.
As the former US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, famously commented, there are no metrics to measure success or failure in what is speculatively being called the 'Long War'. 74 Similarly, in the human security and development-security nexus policy discussions there is a notable lack of any coherent framework for policyplanning or assessment.
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Once we 'ascend from earth to heaven' in an attempt to ground the shift towards values in a material context, it becomes clear that the relationship between interests and ideas is a much more mediated one than that expressed in either the Realist or Post-Realist reading of values as an expression of hegemonic interests or the radical separation between interests and value-based policy-making made by Constructivists.
We are witnessing neither the interest-based projection of hegemonic power nor the value-led challenge to hegemony and traditional forms of power. Rather, idealised policy discourses and practices reflect today's 'hollow hegemony' -the hollowing-out of the traditional frameworks of meaning which reflected and structured Western power.
